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Abstrat. Horizontal integration of aess tehnologies to networks and
servies should be aompanied by some kind of onvergene of authenti-
ation tehnologies. The missing link for the federation of user identities
aross the tehnologial boundaries separating authentiation methods
an be provided by trusted omputing platforms. The onept of estab-
lishing transitive trust by trusted omputing enables the desired ross-
domain authentiation funtionality. The fous of target appliation se-
narios lies in the realm of mobile networks and devies.
1 Introdution
Current information tehnology imposes on users a multitude of heterogeneous
authentiation mehanisms when they want to aess networks, servies, or on-
tent. The tehnial aess hannels to these desiderata are, however, undergoing
a ontinual proess of onvergene. The mobile domain provides a striking exam-
ple [1℄. The aess to servies through mobile devies shows a trend to beome
network-agnosti. Driven by the horizontal integration of tehnologies, users will
soon be able to onsume servies seamlessly from a single devie via a variety of
hannels and transport methods suh as 2G, 3G, WLAN, Bluetooth, WiMAX,
MobileIP, or the upoming Zigbee. Aordingly, end users' attention will shift
away from the priing of bandwidth to that of ontent and servies. Custom must
then be attrated by oering appliations and ontent with good prie to quality
ratio. Little room is left for returns generated by harging for network aess and
data transport. Business models neessarily undergo drasti hanges, of whih
the mushrooming of virtual network operators is the salient epiphenomenon.
Researh has long forseen this evolution toward `value networks' [2,3℄.
Thus, information networks are beoming ever more servie oriented. On
the appliation layer, identity management (IDM), as embodied, e.g., in the
Liberty alliane standard suite, has proved to be a suessful foundation for
the user-entri integration of servie aess [4℄. Mobile networks with millions
of users and even more identities are already using IDM for essential servies
like roaming [5℄. Yet, arguably, these top-level methods require infrastrutural
support of some kind [6℄. In partiular, it is desirable to overome the boundaries
between logially, tehnially, or even physially separated domains and their
respetive authentiation methods. This signies a seond layer of tehnologial
onvergene, namely onvergene of authentiation methods and the domains of
trust dened by them. This is the subjet matter of the present paper.
We argue that trusted omputing (TC) an be a means to the above men-
tioned ends. In fat, two systems or devies an assure eah other of their being
in a trustworthy state through TC methods like diret attestation. If the devies
arry redentials from various trust domains, they an then use TC-seured
ommuniation to exhange them. This assignment of redentials by trustwor-
thy transmission between arriers yields transitive trust relationships. This allows
for the mediation of trust between domains and user or devie identities, and
in fat, some of the onepts we present are rather similar to logial identity
federation. However, transitive trust by TC enables the traversal of authentia-
tion domains hitherto separated by tehnial or even physial boundaries. The
onept of transitivity of trust relationships was reently analysed in [7℄.
The paper is organised as follows. Setion 2 explains the basi notions behind
transitive trust, in partiular the three most primitive operations supported by
it. The exposition, while theoretial, is not ompletely formalised in view of the
intended appliation senarios. Three of the latter senarios are desribed in
asending level of detail in Setion 3.
Not by oinidene are these appliations hosen from the mobile realm. In
fat we show that mobile devies equipped with TC are not only good arriers
for redentials but also exellent links between trust domains, when applying the
methods of transitive trust. As will beome lear from the few senarios we on-
sider, potential business models, enabled by transitive trust, abound. Needless to
say, the newly oneived trust relationships that we desribe in onrete business
senarios must be supported in the real world by ontratual relationships.
2 Transitive trust by trusted platforms
A ompletely formalised denition is outside of the sope of the present paper,
sine we aim at rather spei appliation senarios. Nevertheless we want to
provide a theoretial desriptions that allows to assess the generi harater of
the transitive trust relationships supported by trusted platforms, i.e., systems
seured by TC as desribed below. A more formal treatment, e.g., along the
lines of [7℄ or [8℄, is ertainly possible. Yet, it would not ontribute muh to
the present topi sine we are more interested in pinpointing the properties and
funtionalities of trusted platforms involved in the establishment of transitive
trust.
We use a simple model for ators in trust domains onsisting of trust prin-
ipals and agents. Trust prinipals are the subjets dening an authentiation
domain by issuing redentials to users or enrolling them to their devies. They
ontrol domain membership and appliable authentiation methods, and there-
fore dene a domain of trust like an identity provider. Trust prinipals are de-
noted by apital letters A, B, C, . . .. Agents asking for aess to servies provided
in a ertain domain are denoted by a, b, c, . . .. The notion of agent signies lasses
of individuals, i.e., groups of agents who enjoy the same aess rights in a er-
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tain appliation ontext when authentiated using their respetive (individual)
redentials. A subgroup of agents is written as a′ ⊂ a as usual.
Credentials γa,A are objets or data whih authentiate agents a with re-
spet to a prinipal A. We do not speify the partiular kind of redentials
used, nor the aompanying authentiation methods. This notion is very generi
and omprises lassial examples like SIM/USIM, Hardware tokens, Smartards,
PKI-based ertiates, PIN/TAN-based methods, or even personal redentials,
e.g., Mahine Readable Transfer Douments or a health (professional) ard.
It should be lear that the overall seurity of the authentiation assertions of
transitive trust that are desribed below depend on the 'weakest link' in the trust
hain. These assertions an in partiular not be stronger than those provided by
the original redentials. Furthermore, the trust sope impliated by a suessful
authentiation, i.e., the spei type of trust assumed in a given prinipal-agent
relationship, may vary from domain to domain. As already mentioned, risks
arising from these omplexities must be assessed and mitigated in the ontext
of the spei appliation senario at hand. Common instruments for that are
ontrats between prinipals and their agents and bridging ontrats between
prinipals.
2.1 Trust redentials
Credentials that an be onstruted basing on the funtionalities of a trusted
platform module (TPM [9℄) play a speial role in our onept. TPMs provide a
number of features that an be used to seurely operate a system. Methods for
the seure generation, storage, and usage of asymmetri key pairs are the foun-
dation for enrypted and authentiated operation and ommuniation. Trust
measurements on the system environment exerted at boot- and run-time allow
for trustworthy assertions about the urrent system state and a re-traing of how
it was reahed. The system state is seurely stored in platform onguration reg-
isters (PCR) tamper-resistantly loated inside the TPM. Memory urtaining and
sealed storage spaes are enabled by pertinent TPM base funtions. Trustworthy
system and appliation software an build on this basis to establish authentiated
ommuniation with the exterior and transmit data maintaining integrity and
ondentiality. In partiular, Diret Anonymous Attestation (DAA), a method
put forward in [10℄ and speied by the TCG, enables the establishment of trust
relationships of a trusted system with external entities. A entral goal of DAA
is to over privay issues related to previous versions of the standards [11℄.
Although ertain aws are known in the TCG standards (e.g. [12℄ points to
a aw in the OIA Protool an authorisation protool whih represents one of
the building bloks of the TPM) that exist urrently future versions are likely to
remedy them. We assume for the purport of our appliations that the funtions
used are at least seured against ommon attak vetors in the senarios below.
Using the desribed funtionality, a trusted system, viewed as an agent a,
an establish what we all a trust redential τa. Speially, we assume that the
trust redential an be used to attest the validity of three fundamental seurity
assertions of a system to the exterior.
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1. The presene of a live and unaltered TPM. This an for instane be ar-
ried out using a hallenge-response method using the TPM's endorsement
redential. Endorsement redentials are pre-installed by the TPM's manu-
faturer.
2. The integrity of the system and its omponents. This property is asertained
through trust measurements and ommuniated via DAA.
3. That an existing redential γa,A is unaltered. This must be established by
trusted system software and omponents used to aess the redential's data.
Again, this assertion is forwarded to other parties using diret attestation
and seure ommuniation hannels established therewith.
These properties are not independent but build on eah other, i.e, to prove 3.
one needs rst attestation of 2. and 1., et. The TPM is apable of reating,
managing, and transmitting own ryptographi redentials whih an onvey
the desribed assertions 1.3.
We now desribe three basi, independent operations for reating trust be-
tween agents and prinipals. These methods represent the essene of transitive
trust enabled by trusted platforms. They all rely on referral trust in the parlane
of [7℄. That is, on the ability of a trusted agent through assertions 1.3., to make
reommendations to trust another agent or even himself in a speial, funtional
role.
2.2 Restrition
By the method of restrition, a subgroup of agents a′ ⊂ a belonging to the au-
thentiation domain of prinipal A an be dened. Agents of lass a authentiate
themselves in the onventional way assoiated to their redential γa,A. This es-
tablishes an authentiated hannel, over whih agents of sublass a′ transmit an
additional trust redential τa′ identifying them as members of a
′
. Sine by this
method the trust and original redentials are used independently, only assertions
1. and 2. are needed.
The additional seurity and in eet higher trust in agents of a′ provided
by them allows to asribe to a′ more servie aess rights than to a-agents. In
partiular, the integrity of lient software an be attested by 2. Those lients an
aess ontent or servies only available to the privileged subgroup. This is in fat
the lassial senario used to enfore opyright protetion through digital rights
management (DRM). A higher seurity level is provided by restrition in a very
generi way. The possibility for A to hek the onsisteny of the trust redential
τa′ with that of γa,A makes at least the sublass a
′
more resilient against loning
attaks on the redential γa,A. This kind of attak is not unommon in the mobile
setor [13℄.
This raised resiliene against loning is the main reason why the usage of a
trust redential is advantageous for the denition of the sublass a′. The latter
denition an be implemented in various ways. The rst-best approah is restri-
tion under the authority of the prinipal. She an manage aess ontrol lists
based on individual trust redentials identifying a single TPM. Or, e.g., she an
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use individual trust redentials to establish a seure hannel with a′-agents and
distribute a shared seret to them. This seret an reside in the part of the sys-
tem proteted by the TPM and thus beome part of τa′ . In turn it may be used
in subsequent authentiation requests toward A, keeping an agent's individual
identity seret.
A proper hoie of enrolment method and time for the trust redential is
essential for the validity of the additional trust provided by the restrition op-
eration. If the redentials γ and τ are impressed on the agents independently
of eah other, i.e., not both under the ontrol of the prinipal A, then, e.g., re-
siliene against loning attaks is restrited. Sine A annot assoiate the two
redentials belonging to an individual agent, she an at best avoid to grant two
agents with idential γ servie aess by using a rst-ome-rst-served approah.
It is possible to improve on this by foring an ativation of τa′ at an early stage,
e.g., the time of roll-out of a mobile devie. Higher loning-resiliene an only
be ahieved if the prinipal individualises both redentials and ontrols their
deployment to the agent.
It may be more the rule than the exeption that the trust redential τa′
provides stronger authentiation than the original one γa′⊂a,A. Conventionally,
τ would then be the preferable redential to authentiate agents of lass a′ with.
It is essential for the understanding of the present onepts to notie that this
is often not pratial. Namely, the ommuniation hannel through whih τ is
onveyed to the prinipal is only available after authentiation by γ. A paradigm
is the aess to mobile networks as desribed in setion 3.1.
2.3 Subordination
By subordination an agent a in prinipal A's domain an enable the aess to
this domain, or ertain servies of it, for another agent a′. By this, a′ is eetively
inluded in A's domain of trust, respetively, A's domain is extended to a′. As
for restrition, a authentiates himself using a generi redential γa,A and then
produes a spei trust redential σa identifying those agents of A's domain who
are allowed to dominate ertain other agents. The subordinated agent a′ shows a
trust redential σa′ to a, who in turn mediates the aess to A's servies, either
by forwarding authorisation requests, or granting them himself. Furthermore,
the authentiation of a and a′ an also be mutual rather than one-sided.
Implementation variants of this operation and authorisation based on it are
manifold, despite its simpliity. The most restritive approah would be to use
the seure ommuniation hannels between a and a′ (mutually authentiated
by σa, σa′), and a and A to forward every single authorisation request from a
′
to A inluding the trust redential σa′ . Independently of the degree to whih
A takes part in authorisation, the at of authentiation for subordination is
generially between a′ and a. Nevertheless, in many senarios σa′ is ontrolled
and enrolled by A, and the prinipal an in implementation variants also partake
in authentiation, e.g., by failitating steps in a hallenge-response protool.
If genuine trust redentials are used for subordination, the operation employs
only TPM funtions 1. and 2. above. TPMs provide user funtions for the re-
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voation of keys, whih is a point of failure in this ase. Thus one might use a
dediated redential γa′,A for subordination. Suh a redential should then live in
the trusted part of the subordinated system and be seured in the authentiation
by funtion 3. to mitigate forgery.
A subordination senario is outlined in 3.2.
2.4 Transposition
Transposition operates between the trust domains of two prinipals A and B.
The authentiation of an agent b of B's domain is mediated by an agent a
of A's domain and the prinipal A. This an make sense for instane if diret
ommuniation between b and B is not possible as in the senario of Setion 3.3.
We assume that authentiation of a to A is done as above. Trust redentials
τa and τb are used for (mutual) authentiation of b to a (or between them). Here,
the third TC funtion of τb is used to prove the integrity of a redential γb,B with
whih b is ultimately authentiated with respet to B. The generi situation for
the latter authentiation is as follows. The redential γb,B is forwarded to A. This
bears the assurane that an authenti (by γa,A) and untampered (by τa) agent
has handled the latter redential. In eet a establishes a trusted path for the
transmission of γb,B. Whether or how γb,B is transferred from A to B to nally
authentiate b depends on ommuniation means and ontratual relations. The
transposition onept leaves this open.
Again, transposition an be implemented in numerous variants. In partiular,
part or all of the funtionality neessary for authentiation of b an be deferred
to A or a. From B's perspetive, eieny gains by suh an outsouring or even
deentralised approah to authentiation must be balaned with the protetion
of serey of his business data and proesses, whih, to a ertain extent have to
be turned over to A.
On the other hand, in the generi transposition operation where γb,B is for-
warded to B who in turn ompletely ontrols the authentiation of b. Then,
additional ryptographi means an be applied to render any sensitive informa-
tion about the relationship of b and B inaessible to a and A. In partiular, B
might want to keep his agents anonymous to A, and even the mere size of B's
domain of trust might be an informational asset worth of protetion.
3 Senarios
This setion outlines three onrete appliation senarios of eonomial rele-
vane, orresponding to the three operations explained above. The rst two are
skethed on a rather high level, while the third and most omplex one is used to
detail proesses and protools. A detailed desription of the rst two senarios
would be very similar.
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3.1 Funtional disrimination of mobile devies
As already said, the paradigm for restrition senarios is DRM. We want to
pursue a slightly dierent diretion and take a look at the relationship between
network operator and ustomer in the mobile domain. The standard form of
ustomer retention exerted by the MNO is SIM-lok, a rude form of funtional
restrition of mobile devies bonding mobile devies to SIMs of a ertain MNO.
Based on transitive trust restrition, a ner grained funtional disrimination of
mobile devies beomes possible. Depending on the devie vendor's and MNO's
business models, various lient funtions of the devie an be restrited to ertain,
more or less privileged ustomer groups. The management of mobile devies,
of whih funtional disrimination is an important instane is viewed by the
industry as a fundamental appliation area of TC [14℄.
A multitude of benets arue to MNO and ustomer in this kind of senario.
First, it is ost-eient to produe a single produt line with many appearanes
to the end-user, rather than marketing a multitude of makes and models as
ustomary today. Seond, the up- and downgrading of funtionalities an be
implemented dynamially, without physial aess to the devie. To the user,
the relative seamlessness with whih devie ontrol operates is an ergonomi
benet and allows for better ustomisation and even personalisation.
The eient means to implement funtional restritions of mobile devies
is provided by the trusted boot proess and operating system of the trusted
platform it represents. Thereby, the trust redential an attest two properties
via DAA. First, that the devie belongs to a ertain, restrited group dened
expliitly or impliitly by a list of enabled funtions. Seond, that the devie
atually is in a state where only the allowed funtions are enabled. The set
of funtions to be managed ould be pre-ongured and the dynami ontrol
eeted via simple hanges of parameters, e.g., for values in PCRs.
The enforement level of this approah is stronger as ompared to SIM-lok
preisely beause the trusted platform's base operation software is tamper resis-
tant. Based on this assurane, the MNO an deliver spei servies or ontent
only to the restrited group privy to it. Thus funtional restrition provides the
foundation on the lient side for further servie disrimination, poliy enfore-
ment, and DRM proper.
As a simple instane using the transitive trust restrition operation, a prepaid
mobile phone an be implemented. The phone arries in its trusted storage area
a running total whih is deremented by a trusted software. While the initial
aess to the mobile network is still established using SIM authentiation, DAA
and the trust redential then yield assurane to the MNO that the running total
is nonzero, upon whih aess to the network's ommuniation servies an be
granted. This releases the MNO from operating (or paying for) a entralised
aounting.
3.2 Bonding of mobile aessories
For the mobile domain, an appliation of subordination whih suggests itself is
to extend the authentiation of devies toward an MNO to devies not equipped
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with SIM ards or even physial aess to the mobile network. A ommerial
appliation is the extension of SIM-lok to suh devies. For the purpose of
ustomer retention, suh a sheme an for instane be ombined with loyalty
programmes. Just as SIM-loked mobile phones are highly subsidised, an MNO
an give away tehnial aessories suh as digital ameras, media players, or
high quality headsets. The funtioning of those subordinated devies is then
dependent on authentiation toward a mobile devie or any devie in a spei
MNO's network.
In eet, the aessories an be given away for a very low prie or even
for free on the ondition that they work only within the subsidising MNO's
network. The devies are bonded to the MNO. As an additional benet for the
MNO, the tra generated by subordinated devies is bound to his own network
(as tra volume is a traditional eonomi value indiator for MNO businesses).
Of ourse, advaned servie provisioning an be based on aessory bonding,
e.g., the MNO or another provider an oer storage, organisation, and printing
servies for photographs taken with a bonded amera.
3.3 Point of sales
We now ome to senarios employing the transposition operation, and here
present the related tehnial proesses and ommuniation protools in some
detail.
A user with a TPM-equipped mobile devie wants to purhase a soft drink
from a likewise trust-enabled vending mahine, the point of sales (POS). While
the user still makes up her mind on her taste preferenes, devie and POS initiate
a trusted ommuniation session using DAA and transport layer enryption.
Devie and POS thus ahieve mutual assurane that they are in an unaltered,
trustworthy state, and begin to exhange prie lists and payment modalities.
After the user selets a good and onrms his hoie at his devie, signed prie
and payment proessing information is transferred to the MNO. After verifying
the signatures and optionally informing the good's vendor and a payment servie
provider, the MNO sends a signed aknowledgement to the mobile devie, whih
relays it to the POS, where it is veried and the good is delivered.
The benets for the vendor that arise in this senario basially stem from
the transitive trust relationship that is mediated between MNO and POS by the
mobile devie. It entails in partiular that no network ommuniation is required
during the initiation of a trusted session, that no transation data needs to be
stored in the POS, and that, ultimately, the POS does not need to be equipped
with networking apabilities  at least for the sales proess. In this way the
MNO provides payment servies as well as authorisation ontrol for the vendor.
This requires little more than a TPM and a short-range ommuniation module
in the vending mahine. In extended servie senarios, the ustomer's mobile
devies an as well be utilised to transfer valuable information to the POS, e.g.,
updated prie and ommodity lists, or rmware.
A similar example regards home automation and lets a user and her mobile
devie beome part of the maintenane servie of, say, the heating system of
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Fig. 1. Sequene diagram for the transposition operation from POS b via mobile
devie a, MNO A, to POS owner B. The notation X(·), Y (·) means protetion
by serets X , Y shared between b and B.
her home. Based again on their respetive TPMs, heating system and mobile
devie establish a seure ommuniation hannel to exhange maintenane data,
or data used for metering. This an be done both at spei user requests or even
seamlessly during normal operation of devie and heating system, every time the
mahine-to-mahine ommuniation module of the devie gets in the range of
the one in the heating system. In this way, the mobile devie an notify user and
a maintenane hain about neessary repairs and also support aounting and
billing. Here, a trusted omputing approah not only ensures the protetion of
personal data, it also enables a simple means of remote maintenane and home
automation in non-networked homes by eiently utilising the mobile network.
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Returning to the POS senario, we now desribe one possible implementa-
tion in more detail. We onentrate on the authentiation proesses and leave
seletion, purhase, and payment aside.
The variant of transposition we onsider is that ofmaximal mutual trust. That
is, both prinipals A, the MNO, and B, the POS' owner, an trust the involved
agent of the other domian, i.e., the POS b, respetively the mobile devie a. The
raised level of seurity ensuing from this may be desirable in partiular from B's
perspetive, depending on the sensitivity of business data handled by a and A as
mediators, for instane if aounting and harging servies of B are transferred
to A. The proess to ahieve this kind of transposition an be divided into two
prinipally independent steps.
A) Establishment of trust of a and A in agent b.
B) Establishment of trust of b and B in agent a.
These two steps are in fat equivalent to two subordination operations with
exhanged roles. A sequene diagram for both steps is shown in Figure 1. Note
that A) and B) an be interhanged or even overlap.
The two main steps must both be preeded by an establishment of a seure
ommuniation hannel between b and a and between a and A, respetively. For
the latter, the usual log-on of the mobile devie to the network based on γa,A is
augmented by attestation of the trusted platform a via DAA toward A over a
seured hannel based on, say, enryption on the transport layer. For the former,
mutual platform attestation over an enrypted hannel is arried out between b
and a.
A) The trust redential τb of b is passed on to B, attesting to B that there is one
of his untampered POS down the ommuniation line. B then requests and
reeives proper authentiation from b with γb.B. The underlying assumption
that B an assoiate trust and generi redentials of agents in his domain is
a entral anhor for trust in the present variant of transposition. In eet B
is an identity provider for trust redentials of his domain.
B aknowledges suessful authentiation of b to A who passes it on to a.
The trust relationship between the two prinipals and A and his agent a
assures the latter two ator of the authentiity of b.
B) Agent a initiates his authentiation toward B and b by handing his trust
redential to b. This redential annot be utilised by b diretly to authenti-
ate a, but is rather used as a pledge whih is then redeemed by b at the
prinipals. To that end, b uses some seret X he shares with his prinipal
to protet τa. X an for instane be established using the Die-Hellman
method [15℄. The protetion of τa by X prevents a and A from tamper-
ing with the authentiation request that is embodied in the message X(τa)
passed on to B.
It should be noted that, apart from transport and addressing information,
a and A need not know for whih of A's agents authentiation is requested,
if X omprises enryption. Thus, the identity of the authentiated agent a
ould be kept seret from A in an advaned senario. This ould be used to
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protet the privay of agents in the domain of A, e.g., with respet to their
purhasing patterns.
B sends τa to A and with that requests from A the authentiation of it. If
A does not have a registry of all valid trust redentials in his domain or any
other means of authentiating them then A has to exert a seondary authen-
tiation of a by the generi redential γa,A (again assuming that assoiation
of τa to γa is possible). A aknowledges the identity of a to B. This aknowl-
edgement is passed on from B to b, again proteted by a shared seret Y to
prevent tampering with it on its way.
4 Conlusions
We introdued the notion of transitive trust for a pragmati purport. It is in-
tended as a oneptual blueprint for the systemati onstrution of onrete,
TC-based appliation senarios. The examples exhibited show that transitive
trust has a potential to be a fertile onept to that end. In partiular, new ap-
pliation and business senarios are enabled by transitive trust as well as more
eient and/or more seure implementations of old ones. Protetion of privay is
not in opposition to the use of TC in those senarios. It an, on the ontrary, be
supported in arefully onstruted implementation variants of transitive trust.
As said, transitive trust is very similar to (a subset of) identity federation.
Eonomially the prospet to federate the identities of millions of subsribers
of mobile networks with other providers of goods and servies, is rather attra-
tive. TC has additional appliation potential due to the possibility to transgress
boundaries of authentiation domains that are losed to IDM on the appliation
layer.
A partiular trait of transitive trust mentioned above is the enabling of de-
entralised authentiation through the trusted agents. A benet of suh ap-
proahes an be enhaned resiliene and availability of servie aess. They an
also be a base for de-entralised authorisation and ultimately de-entralised busi-
ness models, suh as super-distribution of virtual goods from agent to agent,
f. [16,17,18℄.
As a further example, in an advaned senario for the restrition operation,
it an be envisaged that a group of agents denes itself in a manner similar
to building a web of trust [19℄ of whih PGP is a well-known instane [20℄. To
that end, the transposition operation ould be used to establish mutual trust
between agents, extend it to trust paths in a ommunity, and eventually dene
the subgroup as the resulting web of trust.
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